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Abstract  
We analyse trade between countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in Eastern 
Europe between 1950 and 1990. Despite central planning and political motivation of the 
CMEA, we show that trade could be explained by standard demand factors surprisingly well. 
Moreover, we document that the oil price crisis had several repercussions on Eastern Europe. 
The Soviet Union as a supplier of crude oil benefited from the energy crisis in the 1970s. In 
particular, it used energy exports as an instrument of foreign policy. In turn, the responses of 
the individual CMEA countries in Central Europe were largely different.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper analyses structural change in Soviet foreign trade with the other member countries of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Foreign trade is indicative of a country’s 
economic and political priorities. The CMEA is perhaps one of the most vivid examples where 
foreign trade mirrors politics and policy choices. Ideological and political, not economic 
considerations laid the basis of the CMEA’s existence and determined further development. The 
result was a unique economic organization composed of several small member states at very 
different levels of economic development and one superpower, which, however, was not at the 
same time the economically most advanced among the members. On the contrary, the main 
commodities of export the Soviet Union contributed to CMEA trade were raw materials and in 
particular fuels.  
The system of trade in the CMEA was established according to Soviet principles, the defining 
feature of which with regard to foreign trade was that it should be immune to unpredictable 
external influences. Through the state monopoly on foreign trade planned economies wanted to 
secure control of the channels of foreign impact.  
Structural change is defined as a permanent change in the parameters of the trade functions. With 
regard to the world economy, the oil crisis of 1973 generally underscored an emerging structural 
crisis which was followed by a radical change from the old technological regime. With regard to 
CMEA economies in particular, a change in the general level of world prices, as was the case in 
1973, was one of the channels identified as possibly having an impact on planned economies 
despite their monopoly on foreign trade (Trzeciakowski 1987, p.465). Furthermore, energy 
played a particular role in CMEA trade as CMEA member states were dependent on the Soviet 
Union for energy exports.  
The CMEA features only marginally in historical studies, which are concerned with the overall 
development of communism, the Soviet Union and its relations to Eastern Europe. Historical 
studies of the smaller member countries tend to give more details on the CMEA taking into 
account the relatively greater impact the organization had on these countries. This paper provides 
the first analysis of CMEA trade over the entire period of its existence and focuses on the impact 
the oil crisis had on the CMEA. It, therefore, also provides a run-up history to the recurring 
discussions on dependence and political dimensions to energy supplies from Russia. We find that 
trade activity in the CMEA began to increase only by the late 1950s. Contrary to official 
announcements of the time and socialist ideology, a structural break occurred in CMEA trade 
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after the first oil crisis in 1973. Afterwards CMEA countries turned inwards and intra-CMEA 
trade increased. Only with regard to Soviet exports, however, trade continued to increase 
virtually until the collapse of the CMEA. With regard to exports from the smaller CMEA 
member states to the Soviet Union there was also a structural break after 1973. Trade, however, 
began to decline in the early 1980s already, which is indicative of politically motivated turning 
away from the CMEA by the smaller member states. Trade between the smaller member states 
developed in parallel to that with the Soviet Union, however on a lower level and without a 
distinct break. Trade activity between these states also declined by the early 1980s.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the history of the 
CMEA in so far as it is relevant to structural change, i.e. drawing attention to the main phases of 
development and analyzing internal and external sources of structural change. Section 3 portrays 
and discusses the particular role of energy in intra-CMEA trade. Section 4 provides the 
econometric analysis of structural change in Soviet foreign trade with the CMEA countries and 
leads to the conclusions in the last section.  
2 Historical Overview 
Ideology and the economy in socialist states were closely interlinked: Success of the latter was 
taken as proof of the former and formed the basis of legitimacy for the system as a whole. Marx’s 
vision of communism with regard to foreign trade promised an economy in control of the 
influence that other countries could have on it, and thus immune to the recurring economic crises 
of capitalism. The socialist revolution was expected to turn into a world revolution, so that 
foreign trade would also come to be governed by socialist economic principles.  
The Russian Empire had been highly dependent on foreign economies for investment, technology 
and also human resources (Smith 1993, p. 20), exacerbating the task for the Bolshevik regime of 
insulating itself from “capitalist crises”. In April 1918 a decree on the Nationalisation of Foreign 
Trade was passed, which established a state monopoly on foreign trade. Trade was a means to 
meet the overall plan. Imports were the means to accelerate domestic industrialisation, exports 
the necessary expenditure of domestic resources to obtain these imports. (Smith 1993, p. 43) In 
reality, however, the difference between world market and domestic prices was covered by the 
state budget: Isolation ultimately created macroeconomic disequilibria.  
Until World War II the Soviet Union was the only planned economy and pursued economic 
“success” as defined by its ideology in the form of modernisation and industrialisation.  
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After World War II Communist regimes were set up in all Eastern European countries that fell 
under the Soviet sphere of influence. The system of planned economies was established 
according to the Soviet model across these states despite great differences in economic 
preconditions. From the start especially foreign economic relations and trade were a highly 
political issue. In addition to refusing Marshall Aid, none of the Eastern European states 
participated in international economic organisations, established after the War, such as the IMF.  
In early January 1949, an article in Pravda reported the establishment of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA). Its founding members were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Albania joined in February 1949 and the GDR 
in September 1950. Three more countries outside Europe joined much later: Mongolia in 1962, 
Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978. From 1965 onwards Yugoslavia had associate status. In the 
announcement of its foundation the CMEA explicitly distanced itself from the Marshall Plan, 
which it saw as violating national sovereignty. The Pravda article stressed the equality of all 
CMEA members, but the aims of this new organisation were kept rather vague – an increase in 
economic cooperation and mutual aid.1  
There had been earlier proposals to establish organisations for economic cooperation for example 
between Czechoslovakia and Poland or in the form of a Balkan confederation. None of these 
proposals envisioned the participation of the Soviet Union. (Metcalf 1997, pp. 20-22) In contrast 
to these earlier plans and to other economic confederations the CMEA was unique in its structure, 
consisting as it did of one superpower and several small countries at very diverse levels of 
economic development. Its member countries had fairly low levels of mutual trade before World 
War II, so the CMEA’s establishment entailed a considerable redirection of trade flows from the 
pre-war West-orientation.  
The establishment of the CMEA was partly the result of the Soviet Union’s political interest to 
complement military with economic control over Eastern Europe. It was also due to the fact that 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were limited in their choice of trading partners through 
Western embargos, in particular by the establishment of the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). (Zwass 1989, p. 26) In addition, for the smaller Eastern 
                                                 
1 International Arts and Sciences Pr. (1974) ‘Socialist International Organizations: COMECON: The Creation of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Pravda, January 25, 1949’, Soviet Statutes and Decisions. A Journal of 
Translation, 9, 1, pp. 4-5 (p.4).  
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European countries, who had suffered from Nazi occupation, cooperation with the Soviet Union 
brought military protection in exchange.  
Integration within the CMEA was initially very limited. Joint CMEA activities amounted mainly 
to the unification of statistical reporting systems, collecting members’ plans and recording trade. 
(Smith 1983, p. 174) Member states were encouraged to aim for economic autarky and to pursue 
economic development according to the Soviet model, i.e. rapid industrialisation with the main 
emphasis on heavy industry. The Eastern European economies did achieve very high annual 
growth rates – on average 23.5% between 1947 and 1950 (Zwass 1989, p. 24). As in the Soviet 
Union, relocation of labour from agriculture to industrial production and exploitation of domestic 
raw materials were the foundation for growth. Owing to this policy of extensive industrialisation 
and also to Soviet “exploitation” soon a radial pattern of bilateral trade developed with the Soviet 
Union in the centre as key supplier of energy and raw materials and importer of industrial 
products. The East European economies were not integrated with each other through this pattern 
of trade. 
The CMEA only began its active existence after the death of Stalin. Then, reform of the CMEA 
became necessary for both domestic and foreign political reasons. Until the early 1950s the 
economic relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had imposed a considerable 
burden on the Eastern European states. Crucially, for the Soviet Union, many of the East 
European satellite states were not only economically on a more advanced level but its civil 
societies were also more developed even though “semi-suppressed”. (Hosking 2006, p. 270) The 
World War had not destroyed social memory as the revolution and civil war had done in Russia. 
National identity in Eastern Europe remained strong, and could easily turn into anti-Russian or 
anti-Communist feelings. (Hosking 2006, p. 229) Khrushchev’s famous secret speech at the 20th 
Party Congress, therefore, brought a severe crisis of legitimacy to the newly established 
communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Opposition movements and the open protests which 
erupted were often in part driven by economic grievances. Subsequent discussions on how to 
reform the economy and measures undertaken could be broadly summarized as an attempted 
change from extensive industrialisation to intensive development but varied a great deal across 
countries. In consequence to Eastern European “crises”, especially the Polish and Hungarian ones 
in 1956, the planning systems of the CMEA member states became much more diverse and more 
difficult to unite in one economic organisation. Unity in economic matters, however, was 
politically necessary in the Soviet bloc’s rivalry with the West.  
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From the 1950s, therefore, a reform process and intensification of intra-CMEA relations began. 
Initial measures – the abolishment of reparations and improvement of terms of trade - reduced the 
share of the economic burden carried by Eastern Europe. Subsequent reforms had the goal of 
greater integration within the CMEA leading to greater efficiency through the division of labour 
and specialisation of countries according to natural endowments and ultimately establishing a 
trading pattern which would genuinely integrate the partners. Crucially, in contrast to market 
economies the CMEA could not rely on “market forces”; the only mechanism available to 
achieve greater integration was essentially “administrative”.  
With the CMEA Statutes or Charter of 1959 reform of the rudimentary institutional structure of 
the CMEA was initiated.2 Joint production projects were the second major reform effort aimed at 
integrating the CMEA. The “Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour” 
of 1962 saw coordination of national plans as the primary means for achieving the division of 
labour. The second major joint action programme, the “Comprehensive Programme for the 
Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Economic 
Integration” adopted in 1971, placed the emphasis on “integration” of the socialist bloc instead of 
on the division of labour. The chief methods for achieving integration were seen as increased 
cooperation in planning and forecasting, exchange of experience and research work. Furthermore, 
the Programme outlined cooperation on projects of joint interest through joint investment and 
direct contribution of labour and human capital. (Zwass 1989)  
None of these reforms, however, aimed at radical permanent change; rather they were designed 
as a continuous reform process with far-reaching goals and development plans for up to 20 years 
and a smooth increase of foreign trade. Hence, no single reform measure seems radical enough to 
hypothesize a structural break in CMEA trade as a consequence.  
Gorbachev’s coming to power in 1985 did not mark a sharp turning point in CMEA reforms 
either. Reform policy was still influenced by competition and comparison with the West: In 
December 1985 a new “Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technological Progress up 
                                                 
2 The council meeting was established as the highest authority, supplemented by the executive committee and CMEA 
international organisation committees, standing sectoral committees, and the CMEA secretariat with its headquarters 
in Moscow. In addition to these coordinating institutions two banks were set up. The International Bank for 
Economic Cooperation was established in 1962. This Bank was designed as an international clearing bank. In 1970 
the International Investment Bank was established. The CMEA members contributed capital to this bank according 
to their share in Intra-CMEA trade. One function this bank was designed for was to provide capital investment 
credits for joint production projects. 
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to the Year 2000” was adopted, aiming to “make the community independent of Western 
technology and also to make it invulnerable to pressure and blackmail from the forces of 
imperialism.” (Zwass 1989, p. 161) In general, reforms of the foreign trade system under 
Gorbachev were aimed at streamlining administrative and operative mechanisms and improving 
bureaucratic efficiency. The establishment of joint ventures was permitted and so called “free 
enterprise zones” established (Smith 1993, p. 127). The connection to the central planning system 
and the state monopoly on foreign trade were left untouched.  
Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s new foreign policy of pursuing reconciliation with the West was 
important for CMEA relations as it put an end to the concept of the capitalist West as an enemy 
and Eastern Europe, therefore, lost its importance for the Soviet Union as a “buffer zone”. On a 
domestic level perestroika and glasnost’ had a destabilizing effect on the East European 
countries, even though these policies were not intended as “commodities for obligatory export” 
(Service 2003, p. 464), and Gorbachev probably did not foresee their ultimate consequences. 
Eastern Europe and with it the CMEA had lost its priority status in Soviet political interests. 
Increasingly the negative influence of the CMEA on the Eastern European economies and also 
the disadvantage of intra-CMEA trade for the Soviet Union are topics discussed in official 
documents.3  
The one part of the CMEA trading system which remained essentially unreformed throughout 
was the pricing system. Prices on the domestic market were fixed by each of the socialist 
countries’ planning agencies; they were a means of transferring income between enterprises, but 
not a means of allocation. They did not reflect real value. The CMEA, therefore, developed its 
own pricing system for trade in the form of adapted world market prices converted into 
“transferable roubles”. The transferable rouble was a notional, non-convertible currency unit 
which was used only for the settlement of accounts in CMEA trade. The actual price of a traded 
good was established in bilateral bargaining agreements. The bargaining system divided products 
into soft goods and hard goods. Hard goods were raw materials and products which could be 
traded on the world market for hard currency. Soft goods were goods not in demand on the world 
                                                 
3 Stone 1996, p. 43 quotes a report of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party Central Committee: “The countries are 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the state of cooperation and the circumstances under which it is carried out. 
(…) For its part, the USSR has been compelled to extend credits in order to rectify the balance of payments. (…) In 
all countries, the interest in cooperation is falling because of the quality and technical level of the goods being 
exchanged.”  
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market. Overall analyses of the CMEA pricing system conclude that hard goods tended to be 
under-priced and soft goods over-priced. Prices for one and the same good could vary a great deal 
between bilateral trade agreements. The fact that trading profits or losses could not ultimately be 
established remained a source of conflict. Both Western economists and Soviet and East 
European planning officials estimated the loss or profit of CMEA member countries using 
various methods, and reaching highly divergent results. Until 1991 there were 6 different systems 
of establishing prices for intra-CMEA trade based on world market prices, but these changes 
never touched the essence of the pricing system. Establishing convertibility in CMEA trade, 
though, was possibly the one essential reform which would have made genuine multilateral trade 
possible.  
At the 45th meeting of the CMEA in January 1990 in Sofia all hopes of reform within the CMEA 
structure were given up and unanimous agreement reached to switch all trade to hard currency 
trade. A commission was instituted which would oversee this fundamental restructuring of the 
entire CMEA. In the end, the dissolution of the CMEA was precipitated even faster than the 
member states may have foreseen in 1990. All trade was converted to hard currency by the 
beginning of 1991. The introduction of convertibility has been identified as one of the reasons for 
the collapse of the CMEA. Trade data indicate, however, that a redirection of trade began much 
earlier. (Richter 1994, p. 186) 
To sum up this historical overview, the CMEA was established predominantly for political 
reasons; its reform process was set off by political crisis and continued throughout its existence, 
but the most distinguishing feature of the CMEA remained its radial pattern of trade with the 
Soviet Union in the centre. This overview, therefore, leads to the first hypothesis to be examined 
in the econometric analysis:  
Hypothesis 1:  
The CMEA was a politically motivated free trade area.  
3 The Energy Crisis and its consequences for the CMEA 
As described above, CMEA trade was characterized by a radial pattern of trade with the Soviet 
Union in the centre as the main provider of raw materials and energy. Since the Second World 
War the global economy has seen an unprecedented increase in openness and integration, with 
the rate of growth in world trade consistently surpassing growth in real world output. Increased 
integration was accompanied by continuing technological advances which manifested themselves 
in the “service and communication” revolution at the beginning of the 1970s. Facilitated 
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communication and transportation between countries in turn increased trade. International 
agreements such as the Kennedy Round agreement of the GATT attempted to reduce formal trade 
barriers. Gradually these changes began to force also CMEA member states into incipient 
economic opening up towards the West. In a study of trade of 48 countries 80% of the countries 
are found to show evidence of a significant structural break in their trade-output ratios. (Ben-
David et.al. 1997, p.7) The most frequent break year for imports was the year of the first energy 
crisis, 1973. In contrast to these findings, in 1979 Radio Moscow broadcast: “[The CMEA] is the 
only industrially developed zone on this planet which has not been affected by the energy 
crisis.”4  
The rapid industrialisation pursued in Eastern Europe and the quasi war-like preparations during 
the Cold War necessitated an extensive use of energy and energy resources. In the 1950s coal was 
the predominant energy source (68%), this share dropping to around 20% during the 1960s and 
70s (IMF, The World Bank, OECD & EBRD 1991, p. 183). As the emphasis in industrial 
production began to change, oil and to a lesser degree gas became more significant as energy 
sources, as well as gaining significance as raw materials for industrial production. Eastern 
European states, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, were initially net energy exporters to the 
Soviet Union. By the early 1960s, partly due to the shift in the composition of energy 
consumption, they had become dependent on the Soviet Union for oil and gas (Balmaceda 2004, 
p. 163). In 1973, the smaller CMEA member states were receiving between 80 and 90% of their 
overall oil imports from the Soviet Union. By the mid-1960s, moreover, readily accessible Soviet 
resources were beginning to be depleted and extraction had to be moved to remoter regions of 
Siberia. The cost of exploration and extraction in these regions was much higher and the distance 
of transportation sharply increased even within the Soviet Union from an average of only 80km 
in 1970, to 1910km in 1980, and to 2350km in 1988 (Smith 1993, p.9). The cost of energy, 
therefore, had been on the agenda of the CMEA for a while before the oil crisis. 
Soviet discussion of this issue recognized the connection between Eastern European 
industrialisation and energy consumption and acknowledged the unequal distribution of energy 
resources. After the energy crisis statements point out the need to increase Soviet raw material 
exports if industrial growth in the CMEA member states was to be maintained (Kosygin 1980, p. 
                                                 
4 Radio Moscow, Broadcast 10 August 1979, quoted in: Kramer, John M.: The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe, 
Toronto 1990, p. 12.  
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30). The CMEA was seen as “a powerful instrument” to solve this problem (Dudinskii 1966, p. 
85).  
Concrete measures discussed in the CMEA were increased domestic production of energy, 
increased imports from developing countries, development of alternative sources of energy, 
especially nuclear energy, and finally improvements in technology and efficiency. The debate 
could acquire a political overtone with regard to possible energy supplies from the West.5 Just 
like in the overall approach to the CMEA, “cooperation” and “integration” were among the most 
frequently used words in discussions on possible solutions for the energy problem.  
As all other prices, prices for raw materials were established in the bilateral bargaining system, 
with the prices for fuel and raw materials generally below world market prices. The oil crisis 
sharply augmented the difference between the world market and intra-CMEA price levels. The 
price increase on the world market radically improved the terms of trade for the Soviet Union in 
relation to Western countries. (Marer et.al. 1992, p. 208) The subsequent increase in hard 
currency revenue contributed to the Soviet economy’s stability at a time when Western 
economies were in shock. None of the other CMEA member states, however, could “smooth” 
their domestic economic problems due to improved terms of trade with the West.   
Soviet economists had criticized the CMEA pricing system in the context of energy trade as 
imposing a burden on the Soviet economy as early as 1966 (Dudinskii, 1966, p.88). Until 1973 
this did not have an effect on Soviet policy. In reaction to the oil crisis, however, the so-called 
Bucharest principle of fixed prices was amended in 1975 to a 5 year moving average. This meant 
a distinct though slightly delayed and smoother increase in prices for energy in the CMEA. The 
East European CMEA member states had different options to react to this: 1) increase purchases 
from non-CMEA suppliers, or 2) increase domestic extraction and improve energy efficiency. In 
relation to the Soviet Union, they could either 3) increase their exports to the Soviet Union to 
compensate for higher raw material prices and thus achieve a balanced import-export ratio. 
Alternatively they could 4) run up a deficit with the Soviet Union, or 5) increase participation in 
extracting and transporting of Soviet fuels.  
The first major cooperation project was the joint construction of the “Druzhba” pipeline, agreed 
in 1959: The traditional infrastructure (ships, trains) had become inadequate, and the Druzhba 
pipeline network helped to double oil exports from the Soviet Union to CMEA member states 
                                                 
5 Sojak, Z. & Riha L. (1968) ‘Cooperation with the Socialist Countries’, Zivot Strany, January 1968, translated in: 
Radio Free Europe Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2000, pp. 1-5 (3), also quoted in: Metcalf, L.K. (1997), p. 99.  
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between 1960 and 1965 (Balmaceda, 2004, p. 163). Other joint projects were undertaken soon 
afterwards, such as the construction of the gas pipeline “Bratstvo”, initially linking the Soviet 
Union with Czechoslovakia. The emphasis on projects of “joint interest” intensified with the 
Comprehensive Program in 1971 and found its continuation in the Long-Term Target 
Programmes. Overall, 70% of the joint projects were located on the territory of the Soviet Union 
(Zwass, 1989, p. 83). The most famous of these probably was the “Soiuz” or “Orenburg” pipeline 
agreed in 1974. In contrast to earlier joint projects the East European states contributed labour 
and equipment to the construction of this pipeline not only on their own territory. Furthermore, 
they also contributed equipment purchased and loans taken out from the West.  
Opposition to the increase in prices or the predominance of joint projects on Soviet territory is 
not expressed in official documents. However, for example one Czech writer in Nové Slovo 
points out that demand for Soviet raw materials on the world market improves the Soviet Union’s 
position vis-à-vis the East European countries: “the Soviet Union makes good use of this fact for 
obtaining excellent credit terms for its oil extraction.”6 The sharpest reaction to the change in the 
pricing system came from Albania, who had withdrawn from the CMEA in 1961: “This fact 
proves once again the true state of the relationship between the USSR and the other countries of 
Eastern Europe. These are capitalist relations, and in no way do they differ from those prevailing 
between metropolitan countries and their colonies where the stronger dominates and exploits the 
weaker.”7 It has been a matter of some controversy and sources suggest different conclusions, 
whether the Soviet Union used energy prices as a policy tool in these bilateral negotiations and 
therefore shielded some countries more than others from the sharp increase in oil prices.8 
Furthermore, Western scholars also debated if and to what extent the Soviet Union used cheap 
                                                 
6 Radio Free Europe ‘Nové Slovo: “Facts About the Economic Links between the CSSR and USSR”, 7 November 
1968’ Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2143, quoted in: Metcalf, L. K. (1997), p. 99.  
7 Radio Free Europe (1975) ‘Radio Tirana, 25 February 1975’, Polish Press Survey No. 2472, p. 5.  
8 A letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the CC of the Polish United Workers Party, June 5, 1981 states 
“[Some slanderers] contend that the Soviet Union is “plundering Poland”… one says that of a country which is 
supplying the main branches of Polish industry with deliveries of oil, gas, ore, cotton, at prices one and a half to two 
times lower than world prices.” quoted in Lavigne, M. (1984), p. 150, footnote 1. An excerpt of Jaruzelski’s memoirs 
making a similar point is quoted in: Stone, R. W. (1996), p.104. By contrast, Zbigniew Madej, permanent 
representative to the CMEA remembers: “The economic representatives of the Soviet Union did not make big 
maneauvers before the state of martial law, nor did they help much after it was introduced.”, quoted in: Stone, R. W. 
(1996), p. 107.  
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energy as a subsidy and hence policy tool.9 Relations, therefore, certainly had the potential of 
being interpreted on a political basis, even if trade prices and volumes were established on a 
purely economic basis.  
We will therefore examine the following hypothesis  
Hypothesis 2:  
The Soviet Union was the dominant energy exporter and benefited from the energy crisis. It 
increasingly used energy exports as an instrument of foreign policy after the energy crisis.  
Furthermore, it is likely that the energy crisis did not have a uniform effect on CMEA member 
states. Therefore, we can formulate also the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3:  
The effect of the energy crisis on Soviet exports had different repercussions on Eastern European 
trade.  
4 Econometric Approach to Analysis of the CMEA Trade and Oil Price Shocks  
In previous sections we derived three hypothesis on political economy of CMEA trade from the 
perspective of oil price crisis. These hypotheses will be tested by estimation of a country specific 
trade demand model based on gravity models.  
4.1 Data 
The estimation of the empirical trade equations uses yearly data from 1950 to 1990. Trade flow 
data are taken from statistical yearbooks of the CMEA countries.10 These data in national 
currency units are converted into current US dollars using the official exchange rate. Especially 
during the first years, however, data are not always internally consistent. For the years 1950-
                                                 
9 This debate was sparked off by Marrese and Vanous (1983) with their claim that “(…) the Soviet Union has 
implicitly transferred resources equivalent to $87.2 billion to Eastern Europe during 1960-80; the bulk of these 
resources - $75.5 billion – was transferred during 1971-80. Moreover, unlike debt, implicit trade subsidies are non-
repayable aid.” (Marrese, M., Vanous, J. 1983, p. 3).  
10 Soviet Union: Ministerstvo Vnešnej Torgovli SSSR, Planovo-ėkonomičeskoe Upravlenie: Vnešniaia torgovlia 
SSSR, Moscow annual issues.  
Bulgaria: Nacionalen Statističeski Institut: Statističeskij godišnik na Narodna Republika Bălgarija, Sofia, annual 
Czechoslovakia: Statistická ročenka Československé socialistické republiky, Prague, annual issues.  
Hungary: Hungarian Central Statistical Office: Statistical Yearbook, Budapest 1970-77, 1981-90, data for 1978-1981 
taken from: Vienna Institute of Comparative Economic Studies: Comecon Data 1989, Vienna 1990.  
Poland: Główny Urząd Statystyczny: Rocznik statystyczny, Warsaw, annual issues.  
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1969, therefore, data are taken from Marer (1972), who adjusted these trade data of the individual 
CMEA countries into consistent time series. The year 1991 is omitted from the data series, as 
trade was changed to convertible currencies and overall virtually collapsed. Romania and the 
GDR are omitted from the sample as they are both exceptions in intra-CMEA trade: Romania, 
opposed what it perceived to be attempts at imposing CMEA over national interests and had 
unilaterally withdrawn from CMEA by the late 1960s. The GDR’s trade pattern differed 
considerably from other CMEA members because of its trade with West Germany. The general 
quality of the data from socialist economies has been the subject of debate both before and after 
the collapse of communism. The data is, however, the only one available and therefore has been 
widely used, bearing in mind the possible distortions. The country-specific estimations use the 
largest possible sample for each country. Correspondingly, the sample starts approximately in 
1950/1953 and ends in 1988/1990. GDP data in international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars are 
taken from Maddison (2003). In further estimations oil prices are added as an additional variable. 
Yearly nominal prices for oil in US dollar are taken from InflationData.11 For the purpose of the 
estimation all data are in logarithms. 
4.2 Econometric Specification 
Gravity models were originally proposed by Linder (1961) and Linnemann (1966). They were 
constructed similarly to the law of gravity in physics, hence, they were also often criticized as 
atheoretical approached to trade analysis. Only after more than four decades of intensive use, 
they received a sound theoretical foundation by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Econometric 
analysis proxies force of gravity with trade flows and mass with the trading partners’ GDP. In 
their analysis of structural change in Austrian trade with CMEA Fidrmuc et al. (2008) explain 
exports by income prospects through real GDP and terms of trade. However, the terms of trade 
data are not available for all CMEA countries during the whole historical period. Therefore, this 
omitted variable will be dealt with by time effects.12 
This analysis will estimate a gravity model with panel data for 5 CMEA countries, the Soviet 
Union and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (CMEA4) from 1953 to 1990. It will 
                                                 
11 Inflation Data, Historical Crude Oil Price: http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/ 
Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp, last accessed: 13/07/08.  
12 Imports are not estimated for statistical reasons: In panel data, the demand-oriented variable for imports (GDP of 
the importing country) is the same for every cross section and shows too little variance. Trade in a planned economy 
aimed to be largely balanced, allowing us to draw conclusions about import development from export analysis. 
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first analyse an overall panel with 20 cross-sections and then test these results on a reduced panel 
with 4 cross-sections for the Soviet Union’s exports only. Distance is omitted as a variable from 
the estimation but can be controlled for by fixed effects regression in panel data. Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006) argue that gravity models should be estimated using nominal trade data with time 
and country-specific dummy variables. Estimation of the gravity model will therefore use 
nominal trade data and three sets of time- and country-specific dummy variables:  
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where xit represents exports from the Soviet Union and CMEA4, ycmea stands for the GDPs of the 
countries of destination of the exports. DXSU, DXCM and DCM are the sets of time- and country-
specific dummies: A set of yearly dummy variables for exports from the Soviet Union to CMEA4 
(DXSU), a yearly dummy variable for exports from CMEA4 to the Soviet Union (DXCM) and a 
yearly dummy variable for exports among CMEA4 countries (DCM). Each of these variables is 
defined for individual years, e.g. DXSU70 will take on the value one for exports from the Soviet 
Union to CMEA4 in 1970, otherwise be zero, and DXCM70 will be one for exports from each of 
the CMEA countries to the Soviet Union in 1970, otherwise zero.13  
To test results from the gravity model and a structural break in exports, our analysis proceeds 
with country-specific export demand models. These models use panel data with four cross 
sections for each of the five countries in the above model. The following equation is estimated, 
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where xit denotes exports, ycmea is the GDP of the countries of export destination, αi are fixed 
effects, which capture omitted variables that vary across states but are constant over time. We 
consider a structural break in 1975, which corresponds to the oil price crisis.14 D75 and D75b are 
dummy variables, which should capture the structural change indicated by gravity model results. 
D75 is equal to zero up to 1974 and takes on the value of one afterwards. Similarly, D75b takes 
on the value of one for 1975 and 1976 only, and zero otherwise. The former dummy variable 
                                                 
13 In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, the estimation includes the time- and country-specific dummy 
variables as interaction variables only.  
14 To further examine the possibility of a structural break in exports of the CMEA countries in the mid 1970s, we 
applied a modified Chow test for a break at an unknown date. The QLR statistic is computed over a trimmed subset 
of the sample from 1958 to 1985 with two restrictions, both for the overall panel with 20 cross sections and for 
individual country panels with 4 cross sections each. The results, which are available upon request from authors, 
confirmed a structural break around 1975.  
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explains the long-run effects of different trade regimes, while the latter covers possible short-term 
effects during the regime change. The equation is estimated using period SUR standard errors and 
co-variances, which reduces the autocorrelation of residuals.  
To analyse the nexus between the change in export demand and world energy price increase, an 
additional variable, world oil price, is added to the estimations. Stijns (2003) uses world energy 
prices in a gravity model to analyse the Dutch disease hypothesis. Korhonen and Ledyaeva 
(2008) document the link between trade and oil price in former Soviet Union countries. Oil price 
is added both to equation (1) and equation (2). The non-interacted dummy variable is dropped 
from equation (2) as it is multicollinear with oil prices.  
4.3 Results of Empirical Analysis  
The results of the estimations of equations (1) and (2) for the CMEA panel and all individual 
countries of the sample are summarized in Table 1. We can see that income of importing 
countries is a significant determinant of trade. Actually, this is quite a surprising result given the 
planning system in the CMEA countries. Moreover, the coefficients are comparably high in 
relation to results reported for standard OECD countries (usually close to one).15 This can be 
explained by an excessive orientation of these countries to the CMEA and the isolation of these 
countries. It is also interesting to note that income elasticity of Soviet exports to other CMEA 
countries was especially high. Only Bulgaria and Poland showed slightly higher trade effects. 
The income elasticities of Soviet Union become slightly lower if oil price is included in the 
estimation (see Table 2).  
The dummy and the interacted dummy variables which should capture structural change in 
exports in intra-CMEA trade are significant at the 1% level for all countries, except for Hungary. 
The oil price crisis had two different effects on CMEA trade. On the one hand, the absolute level 
of trade dropped down during the oil price crisis, as indicated by the coefficient for D75b. On the 
other hand, the signs for coefficients of the interacted dummy variable and income in the 
individual CMEA countries are positive, which means that trade reacted stronger to economic 
developments in the target markets.  
Figure 1 plots coefficient values from the regression (1) of the three dummy variables interacted 
with the GDP of the importing countries over the years. As all variables are in logarithms, the 
                                                 
15 A unity income elasticity corresponds to equal distribution of demand between home and foreign products.  
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coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities:16 The results show that the oil price crisis 
influenced the demand for exports from the Soviet Union more that the export demand for other 
CMEA countries. This matches with the fact that the Soviet Union was at the centre of the 
CMEA trading pattern and the largest trading partner for all CMEA member countries. Demand 
for exports from the CMEA4 to the Soviet Union was initially larger than that for exports from 
CMEA4 to other CMEA4, but reaches a very similar level from the early 1970s onwards. Thus, it 
can be seen that between 1973 and 1975 there was an unusually sharp increase in the elasticity of 
Soviet exports (DXSU). In relation to the early 1950s in 1975 Soviet exports had increased by 
12% - with a 3% increase from 1974 to 1975. The increase in Soviet exports continued until 1987 
(21%). Soviet exports then began to decline. The sharp increase in DXSU around 1975 is 
mirrored partly in DXCM (dummy variable for exports from CMEA4 to the Soviet Union) with a 
9% increase from the early 1950s – 2.3% from 1974 to 1975. Exports from CMEA member states 
to the Soviet Union, however, did not continue to increase but rather levelled out until 1980 to a 
maximum of only 11% above the initial level and then decreased. DCM (dummy variable for 
exports between CMEA4) shows a much smoother development: An overall increase of 8.5% 
from the early 1950s and 1% from 1974 to 1975. To sum up, the coefficients show that trade 
activity picks up after 1956 then develops more slowly to increase sharply around 1975. Towards 
the end of the existence of the CMEA there is a marked difference between demand for Soviet 
exports and demand for CMEA4 exports.  
Altogether, analysis of exports of the five CMEA member countries from 1950 to 1990 confirms 
that there was a structural break in CMEA trade during this time and this can be associated with 
the oil crisis.  
The first hypothesis, that the CMEA was a politically motivated union can be confirmed by 
results from Figure 1: After an initially “dormant phase”, trade activity increased after the death 
of Stalin simultaneously with other politically motivated reforms. The energy crisis resulted in an 
increase in trading activity among CMEA member states. The response to the crisis was to 
increase trade among socialist countries, i.e. to turn inwards and attempt to withdraw from the 
world market, to aim for greater autarky from the world market. Interestingly, the phase of 
turning inwards was of limited duration with regard to the CMEA4. The Soviet Union continued 
a high level of exports to CMEA4, thereby possibly trying to support and keep together its sphere 
                                                 
16 In particular, an increase of GDP by 1 percent caused trade growth by reported coefficient.  
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of influence. Results indicate, however, that by the early 1980s interest in CMEA trade from the 
part of the smaller member states began to decline and fell sharply by 1986 already.  
The effects of the energy crisis were not uniform across countries. The higher level of elasticities 
(Figure 1) for exports from the Soviet Union confirms the second hypothesis that the Soviet 
Union was the dominant energy exporter and benefited from the energy crisis. Results from both 
the gravity and the demand model seem to confirm the second part of the hypothesis that the 
Soviet Union increasingly used energy exports as an instrument of foreign policy. Ultimately, of 
course, this part hypothesis can only confirmed in conjunction with official documents and 
statements (see section 3).  
The third hypothesis that the energy crisis had different repercussions on Eastern European trade 
is confirmed in part in Figure 1. The effect on the Soviet Union was different to that on CMEA4. 
Table 1 shows also that trade elasticity increased more in the Soviet Union (increase by 8 
percentage points) after 1975 than in any other CMEA country.  
By contrast, Hungary, as far as the statistical analysis is concerned, was not significantly affected 
by the oil price crisis during the 1970s. There are various possible reasons for this “immunity” of 
Hungary. Firstly, it might well be that change, even though it occurred, happened much more 
gradually in Hungary’s case. Secondly, Hungary was the most liberalised economy of the 
CMEA4, which could have had the effect of a quicker, compensating response of the domestic 
economy. Also, Hungarian energy consumption was lowest in comparison to the other countries. 
Moreover, there is some evidence that Hungary received a 700-million-ruble credit from the 
Soviet Union to cover the increased cost of oil imports between 1976 and 1980 (Stone 1996, p. 
55). However, individual country results do not give reason to confirm that the Soviet policy was 
to shield one of the CMEA members more than another from the effects of the energy crisis.  
Adding oil price as a variable to the overall gravity model in equation (1) and the individual 
countries’ demand models in (2) confirms that world oil prices are a significant determinant of 
overall exports of the CMEA countries.17 The oil price crisis contributed to the inward orientation 
of the CMEA trade. Our results (see Table 2) confirm that oil prices are a significant determinant 
of exports between CMEA countries, with Bulgaria as an exception, where the variable is only 
marginally significant. For Hungary, the interacted dummy variable hypothesising structural 
                                                 
17 Adding oil prices to the estimation seems to distort coefficients for the time- and country-specific dummies. The 
reason for this could be that oil price change over the years is correlated with the time dummies, even though these 
are added to the equation only as interacted dummies.  
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change in 1975 remains not significant, as in the estimation of the demand model without oil 
prices. In Poland, the interacted GDP variable becomes insignificant. However, oil prices are 
significant for exports of both countries, which confirms the importance of oil shock also for 
them. For all other countries, both oil prices as well as the interacted dummy variable remain 
highly significant. Coefficient values in comparison to the demand model results without oil 
prices are approximately halved. With exception of Poland, the coefficient for the oil price is 
highest for Soviet Union, which is another confirmation of hypotheses 2 and 3.  
5 Conclusions 
Econometric analysis of Soviet foreign trade with the CMEA countries confirmed that there was 
a structural break in intra-CMEA trade around the first energy crisis. The change in energy policy 
in the CMEA, however, was not in the form of radical restructuring. It was characteristic of the 
time where the Soviet Union had entered a phase of “stagnation”. The response to the energy 
crisis in the form of “turning inwards” could be interpreted as one last attempt by the Soviet 
Union to shield itself and the states under its influence from external influences. From the 
perspective of the smaller states, one could argue this policy – if only for a limited time – met 
national economic interests for cheaper oil. Ultimately, however, it delayed necessary more 
radical reforms, which, possibly, smaller member states realized when they began to turn away 
from the CMEA by the mid 1980s already. The change in 1973, therefore, was a not one of 
successful restructuring but one preceding the disintegration of the CMEA. Nevertheless, the 
CMEA and especially the pattern of energy trade it developed left a mark which is still 
recognizable today. The infrastructure it created leaves East European countries today still 
dependent on Russia for energy exports. This dependence is perceived as a burden and comments 
that Russia can use energy as an instrument of foreign policy continue to crop up.  
Geoffrey Hosking states that the aim of European supra-national institutions created after the war 
was to “break down distrust between nations”. He continues “Money makes possible the 
exchange of infinitely diverse goods and services (…). It can take many forms (…). But it always 
both presupposes a measure of social trust – consensus that a monetary unit has a certain value 
and will continue to have it – and also confirms and extends that trust” (Hosking 2006, p. 112) 
The CMEA as a supra-national institution failed to break down distrust, and as a trading system 
did not create trust.  
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Figure 1: Gravity Model Coefficients of Dummy Interaction Variables  
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Note: DXSU – dummies in exports from the Soviet Union to CMEA4, DXCM – dummies in exports from CMEA4 
to the Soviet Union, DCM – dummies in exports among CMEA4 countries. Interacted variables are significant from 
1968 for DXSU, from 1969 for DXCM and from 1971 for DCM. 
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Table 1: Intra-CMEA Exports, structural break 1975  
Variable  CMEA a Soviet Union Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland
GDP CMEA 1.33*** 2.21*** 2.70*** 1.68*** 2.15*** 2.36***
D75b  -0.61*** -0.45*** -0.43*** -0.02 0.26***
D75  GDP CMEA  0.10*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.02** 0.03***
intercept  -10.46*** -17.71*** -27.70*** -14.13*** -20.72*** -22.29***
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.97
Observations 760 164 156 152 155 155
Sample 1953-1990 1953-1988 1955-1988 1956-1988 1953-1988 1953-1988
Note:  
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10 level, respectively.  
a – The coefficients of dummy interaction variables are reported in Figure 1.  
 
Table 2: CMEA Trade and World Market Oil Price  
Variable  CMEA a Soviet Union Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland
GDP CMEA 1.10*** 2.10*** 2.66*** 1.63*** 2.06*** 2.21***
D75  GDP CMEA  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** -0.01 -0.01
oil 1.21*** 0.31*** 0.15*** 0.14** 0.20*** 0.28***
intercept  -9.23*** -16.95*** -27.44*** -13.77*** -19.86*** -20.84***
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.98
Observations 760 164 156 152 155 164
Sample 1953-1990 1950-1990 1952-1990 1953-1990 1950-1990 1950-1990
Note:  
***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively.  
a – The coefficients of dummy interaction variables are not reported.  
 
